Muhammad Ali Sajid

We analyze the cross-country spillover effects of corporate tax reforms. Combining firm-level evidence on the 2017 U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) with a quantitative general-equilibrium model, we show how multinational enterprises (MNEs) propagate local policy shocks throughout the global economy. Our framework emphasizes three properties of intangible capital: non-rivalry, mobile ownership, and technology spillovers. We find the TCJA generated positive outward spillovers: First, it boosted U.S. MNEs' intangible investment, raising their foreign subsidiaries' output. Second, it increased tangible investment of foreign MNEs' U.S. subsidiaries, incentivizing them to expand intangible investment at home. Conversely, a Global Minimum Tax (GMT) in the rest of the world generates negative inward spillovers for the United States. It raises the effective tax rate on U.S. MNEs' foreign income, depressing their intangible investment, while simultaneously reducing foreign MNEs' intangible investment and thus their U.S. subsidiaries' output. These findings illustrate the complex trade-offs between tax-base protection and real economic activity in an interconnected policy environment.

Occupational licensing restricts entry to raise quality, but whether the benefits to consumers outweigh the costs of reduced supply remains an open empirical question, particularly in healthcare, where both margins directly affect welfare. This paper provides new evidence on the quantity-quality trade-off in medical licensing by exploiting Alberta’s 1975 reform, which made it the first jurisdiction in North America to require two years of postgraduate training for physician licensure. Using difference-in-differences and synthetic control methods, we find that the reform reduced family physician supply by 13 percent while increasing average workforce quality by 0.22 standard deviations. However, these quality gains were insufficient to offset reduced access: all-cause mortality among working-age adults rose by 12 percent relative to control provinces. The supply contraction reflected both heightened barriers to international medical graduates and occupational substitution toward specialty training. That reduced access, rather than concurrent economic shocks from Alberta’s oil boom, caused the mortality increase is confirmed by cause-specific patterns: deaths from conditions amenable to primary care rose 20 percent, while motor vehicle fatalities showed no differential trend. These findings demonstrate that stricter licensing standards can generate mortality costs exceeding quality benefits, with implications for ongoing debates over extending physician training requirements.